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Abstract
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the extent of the mark-up of the South African manufac-
turing sector, taking into account a number of characteristics of its component industries. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant mark-ups to be present in the South African manufacturing industry. In comparative
terms, the mark-up is approximately twice that found for the US manufacturing sector. We ﬁnd
that industry concentration exerts a positive inﬂuence on the mark-up over marginal cost whilst
an indicator of competitiveness suggests that an increase in an industry’s competitiveness relative
to other industries allows it to raise its mark-up. However, within-industry increases in competi-
tiveness reduces the mark-up. We also analyze the impact of import and export penetration. Both
import and export penetration serve to lower the mark-up. The impact of the business cycle on
mark-up indicates that the mark-up is countercyclical. Finally, accounting for intermediate inputs
signiﬁcantly lowers the absolute size of the mark-up, controlling for the industry’s concentration
ratio. However, relative to ﬁndings on the US manufacturing sectors, SA manufacturing mark-ups
remain approximately twice as large.
KEYWORDS: Mark-up pricing, industry concentration, industry competitiveness, import and
export penetration, business cycles, dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation.
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1. Introduction
Prospects of economic growth depend crucially on the competitiveness of industry. One
manifestation of the extent to which markets are competitive is pricing behaviour within-
industry. This enable one to identify the extent of the imperfect competition in product
markets, by estimating the mark-ups of prices over marginal cost. Martins and Scarpetta
(1999) argues that the impact of macroeconomic policies on output and prices depends
on the level and cyclicality of mark-ups. This has consequences for the design of policies
by government which in turn aﬀect the mark-up behaviour of ﬁrms. Thus the analysis
of mark-up behaviour bridges a gap between industrial organisation and macroeconomic
research. In the present paper we examine the price-marginal cost ratio in the South
African manufacturing sector.
There exists an extensive international literature regarding the mark-up and how to
measure it. However, most empirical studies of the mark-up have focussed on the United
States, though some analyze the mark-ups in OECD countries. One departure point into
the modern literature is Hall (1988).1 Hall’s study did not appear to successfully resolve
the endogeneity problem inherent in estimating mark-ups over marginal cost by employing
measures of Total Factor Productivity. Therefore, due to the endogeneity problem, a number
of studies have followed that have attempted to deal with the apparent upward bias in the
estimated mark-up for the US. A solution to the endogeneity problem has been presented
by Roeger (1995). Utilizing the Hall-approach, but employing nominal magnitudes, Roeger
(1995) serves to remove the source of the endogeneity bias (see the discussion below), while
generating more plausible magnitudes for the mark-up of price over marginal cost.
This paper introduces a number of innovations to the debate. First, to our knowledge the
study is the ﬁrst application of the methodology to a middle-income country. Consideration
of a middle-income country might plausibly alter the ﬁndings established for the US markets.
1For a review of the early literature, with an application to the South African manufacturing sector, see
Fedderke (1992). Other classic references are Eichner (1973, 1987), Gordon (1948), Hall and Hitch (1939),
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Middle-income countries typically lack market sizes which might allow them to exploit the
economies of scale open to US producers. Conceivably therefore, access to international
markets might prove to exercise a greater impact on pricing for developing countries vis-à-
vis developed countries, with similar conclusions following for import penetration into the
domestic economy. To our knowledge these questions have not yet been explored empirically,
and our study allows for a comparison of the mark-up in the South African (middle-income)
manufacturing sector with that found in the comparable US manufacturing sector.
Second,a ni m p o r t a n tq u a l i ﬁcation applies to any empirical application of the methodol-
ogy estimating the mark-up over marginal cost. The ﬁrst of these is that the methodology
of estimating the mark-up from the relation between the Solow residual and measures of
input costs is an explicit one, presumed to hold in long run equilibrium states. Noting that
real world processes seldom reﬂect pure equilibrium states is trivial - but the implication
is that any empirical application of the mark-up methodology has to account not only for
the nature of the equilibrium relationship predicted by theory, but also for the fact that
dynamic adjustments to equilibrium may be an important feature of the modeling. Thus far
estimation of mark-ups has proceeded mostly by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
speciﬁcations, on an industry-by-industry basis.
In order to address this limitation to the empirical methodologies employed thus far, the
present paper departs from the estimation methodology employed in previous studies, by
employing an alternative estimation method. We employ the dynamic heterogeneous panel
estimation technique proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), in the form of the Pooled
Mean Group Estimator (PMGE). The advantage of this technique is that it incorporates the
recognition of an explicit long run relationship, as well as short run dynamics. The obvious
objection to the use of a panel estimator is the reason motivating an industry-by-industry
estimation approach: industries may prove to have heterogeneous mark-ups. There are cer-
tainly many reasons why sectors diﬀer substantially - from the degree of trade liberalization,
developments within labor market institutions, trade composition, market structure and con-Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 4
testability, amongst others. The advantage of the PMGE is that homogeneity across sectors
need not be assumed, but tested for. Use of the PMGE allows for both dynamics across time
periods and heterogeneity across cross-sectional units, since it allows us to simultaneously
investigate both a homogenous long-run relationship and heterogenous short-run dynamic
adjustment towards equilibrium. The net result is the achievement both of substantial sta-
tistical power from the panel, without denying the importance of sectoral heterogeneity.
Third, the paper controls for a range of possible determinants of mark-ups. These include
the possible impact of business cycles,2 the extent of import and export penetration,3 the
impact of market structure,4 as well as some new estimates of industry competitiveness.5
Both the explicit control for market structure and for international competitiveness repre-
sent a further advance on the existing literature. In all cases, except the tests for the impact
of cyclical variation, we control for both within- and between-industry variation in the de-
terminant of the mark-up. Finally, we also control for the possible impact of intermediate
inputs on the magnitude of the mark-up, again comparing the resultant mark-up in the
South African manufacturing sector with that found for the US manufacturing sector.
For the South African manufacturing sector we ﬁnd a mark-up that is consistently higher
than that of the US manufacturing sector, with counter-cyclical variation. Both import and
export penetration serves to decrease the mark-up in the respective manufacturing indus-
tries, with the implication that competition on world markets serves to discipline domestic
producers. Increased industry concentration increases industry mark-up. By contrast, in-
creased between-industry competitiveness, as measured by falling relative unit labour costs,
increases industry mark-ups, though increased within-industry competitiveness does serve
to lower the mark-up. The implication is that South African industry does not pass on cost
improvements. Finally, including intermediate input costs in the computation of marginal
2See the discussion in Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999).
3See the discussion in Hakura (1998).
4See Fedderke and Szalontai (2004) on the estimates of industry concentration for South Africa.
5See the discussion in Edwards and Schör (2002), and Edwards and Golub (2003) on estimates of inter-
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cost does serve to lower the estimated mark-up, but the South African mark-up continues to
be substantially greater than that of US industry, provided only that industry concentration
is controlled for in regression.
The paper begins with a literature review and theoretical outline in Section 2. Relevant
extensions of the theory are also provided along with previous results. In Section 3 the
estimation methodology is outlined. We report results in Section 4 and conclude in Section
5.
2. Productivity Residuals and the Mark-up
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the primal computation of the Solow
residual (SR), but often termed growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), is related to
the mark-up of prices over marginal cost. Hall (1990) demonstrates that:
TFP = SR = ∆q − α · ∆l − (1 − α) · ∆k
=( µ − 1) · α · (∆l − ∆k)+θ (1)
where µ = P/MC,w i t hP denoting price, and MC denoting marginal cost. Under perfect
competition µ =1 , while imperfectly competitive markets allow µ>1. ∆ denotes the ﬁrst
diﬀerence, lower case denotes the natural log transform, q, l,a n dk denote real value-added,
labour, and capital inputs, α is the labour share in value-added, and θ =
•
A/A denotes
exogenous (Hicks-neutral) technological progress, where is A is the technology parameter.
Estimation of equation (1) faces the diﬃculty that the explanatory variables (∆l − ∆k)
will themselves be correlated with the productivity shocks θ, and hence result in bias and
inconsistency in the estimates of µ. One solution is to instrument, which in turn raises the
requirement that the instruments are correlated with the factor inputs, but not technological
change and hence the error term (θ). In the case of applications to the US, instruments
employed have been pure aggregate demand shifters. In particular, the variables employedMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 6
have been aggregate real GDP, military expenditure, the world oil price, and the political
party of the president.6 Instrumentation for the US led to the estimation of mark-ups that
often were argued to be implausibly high.7
An alternative approach to avoid the endogeneity bias and instrumentation problems has
been suggested by Roeger (1995). By computing the dual of the Solow residual (DSR), we
can again obtain a relation of the price-based productivity measure to the mark-up:
DSR = α · ∆w − (1 − α) · ∆r − ∆p
=( µ − 1) · α · (∆w − ∆r)+θ (2)
with w,r denoting the natural logs of the wage rate and rental price of capital respectively.
While equation (2) is subject to the same endogeneity problems, and hence instrumentation
problems as equation (1), Roeger’s insight was that subtraction of equation (2) from equation
(1) would give us the nominal Solow residual (NSR), given by:
NSR = ∆(p + q) − α · ∆(w + l) − (1 − α) · ∆(r + k)
=( µ − 1) · α · [∆(w + l) − ∆(r + k)] (3)
in which the productivity shocks (θ) have cancelled out, removing the endogeneity problem,
and hence the need for instrumentation. The mark-up is now accessible to simple OLS
estimation, or computation.8
While problems of endogeneity are addressed by equation (3), there is an additional
diﬃculty arising from the assumption of constant returns to scale, and the use of value-
added measures of output. Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) demonstrate that where
6See for instance the discussion in Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999).
7Bias remains a problem for an application to the South African data. For this reason we exclude the
Hall methodology from the South African study.
8Trivially, µ − 1=
∆(p+q)−α·∆(w+l)−(1−α)·∆(r+k)
α·[∆(w+l)−∆(r+k)] .Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 7






· α · [∆(w + l) − ∆(r + k)] (4)
where λ>1 denotes increasing returns to scale.9 Thus any estimate of mark-up that follows
from Solow residuals should be interpreted as lower-bound values if increasing returns to
scale are present.
2.1. Sectoral Business Cycles and Dynamic Mark-Ups
Empirical studies have indicated the possibility of mark-ups sensitive to the business cy-
cle,10 though their reliance on the Hall methodology is likely to compromise their reliability.11
Theory is ambiguous concerning the expectations we might form on mark-up behaviour over
the business cycle. Both counter- and pro-cyclical mark-ups are feasible.
Oligopolistic markets, in which conjectural response behaviour is present, would generate
mark-ups that depend on market conditions. In such cases, where capacity constraints are
present, mark-ups would be pro-cyclical.
Counter-cyclical mark-ups are also feasible. Where entry into markets is feasible, ex-
pansion of demand would lead to entry, increased competition, and downward pressure on
the mark-up.12 Where ﬁrms develop customer bases during expansions mark-ups may again
prove counter-cyclical.13 Should ﬁrms defecting from cartels increase market share during
upturns, the gain from increased market share may outweigh the long term loss from cartel
punishment.14 Moreover, since proﬁt maximization implies that the mark-up is an inverse
function of demand elasticity, the mark-up will prove counter-cyclical as long as product
variety is pro-cyclical.15
9The point about equation (3) is that it assumes λ =1 .
10See Bils (1987), Domowitz et al (1988), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), Morrison (1994), Haskel et al
(1995), and Beccarello (1996).
11See the discussion in Ramey (1991).
12See Chatterjee (1993).
13See Bils (1987) and Phelps (1994).
14See Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996).
15See Weitzman (1982).Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 8
As long as one is able to postulate a linear relationship between price margins and a
measure of cyclical demand ﬂuctuation (C), then we may estimate:16
NSR = B · ∆x + γ · [∆x · C − ∆C]
where ∆x = ∆(p + q) − ∆(r + k) (5)
where B = P−MC
P =1− 1
µ is the Lerner index, such that µ = 1
1−B gives the ﬁxed component
of the mark-up, while γ provides an estimate of the cyclical component of the mark-up.
For the measure of cyclical ﬂuctuation, the literature has employed aggregate employment,
capacity utilization,17 sectoral employment,18 and deviations of output from long term trend
as given by the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.19
2.2. The Open Economy Context
The discussion thus far has ignored the impact of the open economy context. Yet tariﬀ
and other restrictions clearly carry implications for the degree of international competition
to which domestic industry is exposed, and hence the magnitude of the feasible mark-up that
16See the discussion in Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999).
17Both in Haskel et al (1995).
18See Bils (1987).
19See Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999). One limitation of this approach is that equation (5) follows
from a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of the primal and dual Solow residuals. Strictly speaking this allows
estimation only of the steady-state mark-up (µ), not of cyclical eﬀects which are second-order. Under the
assumption of technology that is Leontieﬀ, with capital and labour nested in a value-added function which
combines with intermediate inputs (let the function be denoted G), and with Hicks neutrality in technological
progress, a relation for variable mark-up is given by:
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¶
· ∆l − µ · sM · ∆m
where ∆pG + ∆g denotes the change in nominal value-added, σG the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour in the value-added function, si the share of factor i in gross output, L the amount of




gives an indication of the degree of downward rigidity in









case for complete rigidity. In the application by Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999), the cases given by
σG =1 , 0.5, 2, were considered, as well as L =0 , 0.4, 0.2.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 9
domestic industry can maintain. By implication, the suggestion is that trade liberalization
is a means by which ineﬃciency in production can be remedied.20
Hakura (1998) oﬀers one means of incorporating the open economy context into the esti-
mation of mark-ups over marginal cost. The starting point of analysis is the suggestion that
tariﬀ and other trade restrictions shield domestic industry from international competition.
Hence reduction in trade barriers should decrease the market power of domestic producers,
through increased import penetration, decreasing mark-ups of price over marginal cost. The
suggestion is thus that trade liberalization will reduce the pricing power of industry.21 The
impact of exports on mark-ups is more ambiguous. Increasing export ratios might be argued
to increase exposure to competitive pressure, leading to reduced mark-ups. However, where
producers can price discriminate between domestic and international markets, or in the pres-
ence of a corresponding product diﬀerentiation, the relationship between export ratios and
mark-ups may prove positive.
The relationship tested by Hakura (1998) is given by:22








it + η3,i + uit (7)








where dv denotes the log change in value-added, sva the share of factor a in value-added,
sym the share of intermediate goods in gross output, IPR denotes the import penetration
ratio, and i denotes the i0th industry. While η1 provides a measure of the mark-up, η2
captures the impact of deviations of import penetration from the sectoral mean value of
import penetration on the mark-up. Where η2 < 0, rising import penetration lowers the
mark-up, where η2 > 0, rising import penetration raises the mark-up. The ﬁxed eﬀects of
each industry are measured by the η3 parameter.
20See for instance the discussion in Helpman and Krugman (1989).
21ibid.
22The panel employed in the Hakura study employs both cross-country and cross-industry elements. The
reported equation has adapted this to the cross-industry panel context employed in the present study.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 10
While in the Hakura study, η2 is held to be homogenous across countries and industries
by assumption, in the present study our panel estimation methodology allows us to test
whether the assumption is justiﬁed.
An additional diﬃculty is that the speciﬁcation given by equation (7) is again subject to
endogeneity problems, since production and input change decisions are likely to be simulta-
neous. We therefore again subject the speciﬁcation of equation (7) to the transformations
suggested by Roeger (1995).
A ﬁnal extension proves necessary due to the use of panel data in the present study.
Estimation of the mark-up on an industry-by-industry basis requires a control only for within-
industry variation of import penetration in order to capture trade eﬀects. In a panel data
context, this is not suﬃcient, since variation in import penetration between industries is not
captured, omitting an important source of heterogeneity between industries. For this reason
we estimate the following speciﬁcation to test for the impact of import penetration on the
mark-up:










(α · [∆(w + l) − ∆(r + k)])it + uit
where Xi denotes the mean import penetration (IPR)f o rt h ei0th industry, X denotes the
mean IPR across all industries, and Xit the industry speciﬁct i m ev a r y i n gv a l u eo ft h eIPR.
Thus θ2 captures the impact of within-industry variation of import penetration, and θ3 the
between-industry variation in import penetration on the mark-up.
Interpretation of the results is symmetrical with equation (7), except that endogeneity
problems are absent.
Finally, we can provide symmetrical speciﬁcations to equations (7) and (8), replacing the
import penetration term, IPR, with the export penetration term, EPR.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 11
2.3. The Impact of Market Structure and Industry Performance
Another important consideration concerns the impact of market structure on the mag-
nitude of mark-ups. Market concentration may determine the pricing power of ﬁrms, and
hence the mark-up of price over marginal cost.23 Of course, contestability of markets may
limit the ability of domestic producers to exercise market power even in the presence of high
degrees of industry concentration.24 Due to the fact that it may be problematic to control for
the contestability of markets, the eﬀect of industry concentration on mark-ups is therefore
ambiguous, and must remain a matter for empirical determination.
Given the use of panel data for the present study, it is again appropriate to control
for both within-industry and between-industry variation in market structure. In order to
anticipate the now standard endogeneity problems, we therefore specify the equation (8)
relationship with Xit denoting the concentration ratio of sector i in period t, while Xi denotes
the mean concentration ratio of industry i and X denotes the mean concentration ratio of
the manufacturing sector as a whole. While θ1 provides a measure of the mark-up, θ2 now
captures the impact of deviations of concentration from the industry mean concentration
ratio on the mark-up, and θ3 measures the impact of deviations of concentration from the
manufacturing sector’s mean value of concentration on the mark-up.
An additional consideration is that industry performance may also inﬂuence pricing be-




η ,w h e r eMCi denotes
i0th ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost, si the market share of ﬁrm i, λi the i0th ﬁrm’s expectation of anticipated
competitive behaviour of rival ﬁrms (λ>0 implies an expectation of an increased production by rivals and
vice versa), and η the market price elasticity of demand. Thus there is a potential relationship between
price-cost margins and market power, the strength of which is determined by the price elasticity of demand.
Under Cournot (1938), λi =0 ,s u c ht h a t
p−MCi
p = si
η , providing a direct relation between price-cost margins








η+(1−sd)ss,w i t hMCd, sd and ss denotes marginal cost, market share of
the dominant ﬁrm and the market share of fringe ﬁrms, respectively. See Waterson (1984), and Gollop
and Roberts (1979). See also Tirole (2000, p221), where the proﬁt - revenue ratio equals the Herﬁndahl
index - price elasticity of demand ratio. For the more complex case of pricing in the presence of product
diﬀerentiation, see Cubbin (1983).
24Though not completely. Bain (1956) limit prices that eﬀectively impede entry do not require perfectly
competitive prices to be realized. In South Africa, Modigliani’s (1958) conditioning of limit pricing on
economies of scale in production, market size and price elasticity of demand may be particularly important.
See also Tirole (2000, p308).Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 12
haviour. While concentration may serve to enhance pricing power, an industry’s cost com-
petitiveness may also have two possible eﬀects on ﬁrms’ ability to price above marginal cost.
Where there are strong competitive pressures present in the industry, price should be driven
toward marginal cost of production even in the presence of cost reductions. Alternatively,
where ﬁrms possess pricing power, reductions in production costs would translate into in-
creased price-cost margins. Variation in an industry’s cost competitiveness could thus either
serve to increase, or leave unaﬀected the mark-up of price over marginal cost. Industry cost
competitiveness may or may not translate into price competition, and the net impact of
cost competitiveness on price over marginal cost mark-ups remains a matter for empirical
determination.
As is now standard, the panel data used in this study necessitates controlling for both
within- and between-industry variation in cost competitiveness. Similarly, to control for
the now standard endogeneity problems noted for the present context, in equation (8) we
therefore specify Xit as the cost competitiveness of sector i in period t, while Xi denotes
the mean cost competitiveness of industry i and X denotes the mean cost competitiveness
of all manufacturing sectors. Thus θ1 again provides a direct measure of the mark-up, θ2
captures the impact of deviations from the industry mean value of cost competitiveness, and
θ3 measures the impact of deviations of cost competitiveness from the aggregate mean value
of cost competitiveness across all economic sectors on the mark-up.
2.4. Accounting for Intermediate Input Costs
A ﬁnal consideration arises from the speciﬁcation of marginal cost. A sequence of studies,
from Norrbin (1993) to Basu (1995)25, have pointed out that specifying marginal cost in terms
of capital and labour inputs would serve to bias upward the estimate of marginal cost, due
to the omission of intermediate inputs. Incorporating intermediate inputs modiﬁes equation
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αGO · ∆(w + l)+β









where the GO superscript denotes gross output values, and m and pm denote intermediate
inputs and intermediate prices, ∆(w + l) denotes the log change in nominal labour cost,
∆(pm + m) the log change in nominal intermediate goods costs, ∆(r + k) the log change in
nominal capital cost, and αGO and β
GO are the share of labour and intermediate goods in
gross output, respectively. Empirical application generates mark-ups that lie substantially
below those obtained under the Roeger and Hall methodologies.
2.5. Previous Empirical Results
The Hall (1990) methodology demonstrates that the diﬀerence between output growth
and weighted average of factor input growth (based on their respective factor shares), cannot
be entirely attributed to autonomous technical change when perfectly competitive markets
are not in existence. Hall proves that if price exceeds marginal cost, the input shares per
unit of output do not sum to one but are lower because of the impact of mark-ups. He
ﬁnds mark-ups to be pro-cyclical for the US manufacturing sector and concludes that this
may be due to the existence of monopoly power in the product market. He argues that this
monopoly power evident in the pricing behaviour of American ﬁrms may be due to oligopoly
behaviour and product diﬀerentiation.
Studies investigating the mark-up experienced in the US manufacturing industry do ﬁnd
that applying the Hall (1990) instrumental variables methodology does appear to contain
an upward bias relative to the Roeger (1995) methodology. This diﬀerence between the two
methodologies may be due to the fact that the Hall methodology is sensitive to the choiceMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 14
of instruments employed to capture pure demand shocks.26 The Roeger (1995) approach
illustrates that more than 90 percent of the diﬀerence between the primal and dual produc-
tivity measures is due to the presence of imperfect competition in the US manufacturing
sector. Unlike Hall (1990), the Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) study support the
hypothesis of countercyclical mark-ups for the US manufacturing sector, especially in the
presence of downward rigidities of labour inputs. This they argue may be the reason for
the existence of procyclical real wages. Moreover, they claim that the presence of persistent
mark-ups in the manufacturing sector may be due to the presence of entry barriers due to
sunk costs, that are not eroded by competitive pressures. Also, the predicted upward bias
of mark-ups obtained from value-added output measures does appear to be present in the
Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) study. Further studies have shown the presence of
counter-cyclical variation in the mark-up, regardless of whether the estimates are based on
ﬁrst- or second-order eﬀects, the assumption advanced concerning the degree of rigidity of
the labour market, or the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.
Yalcin (2000) investigates the impact of increased import penetration due to trade lib-
eralization on the price-cost margins of domestic ﬁrms manufacturing sector operating in
either the Turkish public or private sector industries. He discovers that while import pen-
etration leads to a decrease in mark-ups in the entire private sector, the mark-up in the
highly concentrated private sector industries increase with import penetration. He argues
that this result implies the possible presence of collusion among domestic and foreign ﬁrms
in more concentrated industries due to the fact that domestic ﬁrms in these industries hold
exclusive distributional and territorial rights to the sale of imported goods due to established
distribution and service networks. Unlike the private sector, increased openness of the public
sector industries is found to decrease mark-ups.
26The Hall (1990) methodology require the instruments used in the analysis of mark-ups to be uncorrelated
with the sectoral technology shocks.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 15
3. The Econometric Methodology
We proceed with an estimation of equations (3), (5), (8) and (9) for the open economy,
the market structure, the industry competitiveness and intermediate goods speciﬁcations.
The panel estimator is provided by the Pooled Mean Group estimator provided by Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (1999).27 Since data employed for this study is stationary,28 estimation can
proceed either by OLS or by Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) estimation.
3.1. The Panel Estimator
Consider the unrestricted error correction ARDL(p,q) representation:










ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit, (10)
where i =1 ,2,...,N, t =1 ,2,...,T, denote the cross section units and time periods respec-
tively. Here yit is a scalar dependent variable, xit (k × 1) a vector of (weakly exogenous)
regressors for group i,a n dµi represents ﬁxed eﬀects. Allow the disturbances εit’s to be
independently distributed across i and t, with zero means and variances σ2
i > 0,a n da s s u m e
that φi < 0 for all i. Then there exists a long-run relationship between yit and xit:
yit = θ
0
ixit + ηit,i=1 ,2,...,N, t =1 ,2,...,T, (11)
where θi = −β
0
i/φi is the k×1 vector of the long-run coeﬃcients, and ηit’s are stationary with
possibly non-zero means (including ﬁxed eﬀects). This allows equation (10) to be written
as:








ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit, (12)
where ηi,t−1 is the error correction term given by equation (11), and thus φi is the error
correction coeﬃcient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
27See also the discussion in Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2000) and Fedderke (2004).
28Space constraints prohibit a report of the comprehensive set of ADF statistics. They are available from
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This general framework allows the formulation of the PMGE, which allows the intercepts,
short-run coeﬃcients and error variances to diﬀer freely across groups, but the long-run
coeﬃcients to be homogenous; i.e. θi = θ ∀ i. Group-speciﬁcs h o r t - r u nc o e ﬃcients and the
common long-run coeﬃcients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation.
Denoting these estimators by ˜ φi, ˜ βi, ˜ λij, ˜ δij and ˜ θ, we obtain the PMG estimators by ˆ φPMG =
SN
i=1 ˜ φi
N , ˆ βPMG =
SN
i=1 ˜ βi
N , ˆ λjPMG =
SN
i=1 ˜ λij




0,...,q − 1, ˆ θPMG = ˜ θ.
PMGE provides an intermediate case between the dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects (DFE) estimator
which imposes the homogeneity assumption for all parameters except for the ﬁxed eﬀects,
and the mean group estimator (MGE) proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), which allows
for heterogeneity of all parameters. It exploits the statistical power oﬀered by the panel
through long-run homogeneity, while still admitting short-run heterogeneity.
The crucial question is whether the assumption of long-run homogeneity is justiﬁed,
given the threat of ineﬃciency and inconsistency noted by Pesaran and Smith (1995). We
employ a Hausman (1978) test (hereafter h test) on the diﬀerence between MG and PMG
estimates of long-run coeﬃcients to test for long run heterogeneity.29 Note that as long as
the homogeneity Hausman test is passed in our estimations, we report only PMG estimation
results.30
Finally, it is worth pointing out that a crucial advantage of the estimation approach
of the present paper, is that the dynamics of adjustment in the mark-up are explicitly
modelled, while recognizing the presence of a long run equilibrium relationship underlying
the dynamics. Thus the justiﬁcation for the use of the PMG estimator is that it is consistent
both with the underlying theory of a homogenous long-run mark-up of price over marginal
cost relationship and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic time series nature of the data. As
long as sector-homogeneity is assured, the PMGE oﬀers eﬃciency gains over the MGE, while
29An alternative is oﬀered by Log-Likelihood Ratio tests. However, the ﬁnite sample performance of such
tests are generally unknown and thus unreliable. We therefore employ the h-test instead.
30The authors thank Yongcheol Shin for the provision of the appropriate GAUSS code for estimation
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granting the possibility of dynamic heterogeneity across sectors unlike the DFE estimator. In
the presence of long run homogeneity, therefore, our preference is for the use of the PMGE.
4. Estimation Results
4.1. The Data
The data employed for this study focus on the three digit manufacturing sectors, over
the 1970-97 period.
We employ a panel data set for purposes of estimation, with observations from 1970
through 1997. The panel employs data for the 28 three-digit SIC version 5 manufacturing
sectors in the South African economy for which data is available. Due to problems with
data availability a number of sectors have been omitted. These sectors are Tobacco, Coke
and Reﬁned Petroleum products, Television Equipment, Professional Equipment and Other
Transport Equipment. In addition, due to missing concentration ratios we have also omitted
the Other Chemicals sector. The list of sectors included in the panel is that speciﬁed in Table
1. This provides a 22×28 panel with a total of 616 observations. For data on TFP growth in
South African manufacturing, we rely on Fedderke (2002). For data on competitiveness we
rely on Edwards and Golub (2002). Data on concentration ratios is obtained from Fedderke
and Szalontai (2004). Further variables for the manufacturing sector include the output,
capital stock, and labour force variables and their associated growth rates.
4.2. Panel Estimation Results for Manufacturing
4.2.1. The Roeger Results
In Table 2 we report the PMGE results for the manufacturing sectors given by the
speciﬁcation:
NSRit = γ0i + γ1ROEGERit + εit (13)
where ROEGERit = αit · [∆(w + l) − ∆(r + k)]Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 18
with αit denoting the share of labour in value-added of sector i, ∆(w + l)it the log change in
nominal labour cost for sector i, ∆(r + k)it the log change in total capital stock for sector i,
and NSRit the nominal Solow residual. γ1 now measures (µ − 1),w h e r eµ = P/MC is the
mark-up.
An important estimation issue concerns the construction of the ∆(r + k)it variable.
ROEGERδ employs the rental price of capital, deﬁned as ((i − πe)+δ)·PK,i,w h e r e(i − πe)
denotes the expected real interest rate,31 δ denotes the depreciation rate on capital stock
computed from the series on depreciation, and PK,i denotes the price index on total capital
stock, to compute the nominal value of capital stock.32 For ROEGER5 we set δ =5 % ,f o r
ROEGER10 δ =1 0 % .33
Results indicate the presence of an aggregate mark-up for the manufacturing sector over
the sample period, and in both instances adjustment to equilibrium as indicated by the φ-
parameter is rapid. The Hausman test accepts the inference of an homogenous mark-up
across manufacturing sectors for the long run.
We note that a signiﬁcant mark-up is present for the manufacturing sector regardless of
whether we employ the ROEGER5 or ROEGER10 speciﬁcations. The distinction between
the rental price of capital computed under the 5% and 10% depreciation assumptions appears
to make relatively little diﬀerence to the implied mark-up in South African manufacturing.
On both estimations for the Roeger methodology, the manufacturing sector mark-up for
South Africa lies above the average manufacturing sector mark-up obtained in the original
Roeger (1995) estimations for the US (79% or 77% as opposed to a 45% average across US
sectors).34 Thus the mark-up in South African manufacturing industry appears to be higher
31We deﬁne i as the yield on 10 year government bonds, while πe (the expected inﬂation rate) is computed
on the basis of a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter on the inﬂation rate.
32Strictly speaking, the rental price of capital should include capital taxes and deductions. However, since
concern here is with the growth rate in the rental price of capital, and capital taxes and deductions do not
show strong variability over time, the computation of the rental price can legitimately abstract from the tax
dimension.
33An alternative would employ the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the nominal value of total capital stock. However,
it is clear that this represents an incorrect computation of the ∆(r + k) term, since it would incorporate
economic proﬁt, thus overstating the cost of capital.
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than in comparable US industries, despite the fact that manufacturing sectors, in producing
tradeables, might be expected to be subject to foreign competitive pressure.
4.2.2. The Cyclical Results
In Table 3 we report the PMGE estimations for the speciﬁcation given by:
NSRit = ζ0CYC1,it + ζ1CYC2,it + εit (14)
where CYC1 = ∆(p + q) − ∆(r + k)
CYC2 = CYC1 · C − ∆C
where (p + q) denotes nominal value-added, (r + k) nominal capital stock, and C an indicator
of cyclical variation. For the present estimations we employ an index of capacity utilization to
proxy for the cyclical indicator.35 The Lerner index is given directly by ζ0 = P−MC
P =1− 1
µ,
containing the ﬁxed component of the mark-up. In order to render the mark-up estimate
consistent with the preceding results, we also report it in the form (µ − 1) =
ζ0
1−ζ0.T h es i g n
of ζ1 indicates the cyclical character of the mark-up directly.
We again employ the two distinct estimates of the ∆(r + k)it variable outlined under the
Roeger results. Thus Cyclical5 employs the rental price of capital under the 5% depreciation
assumption, and Cyclical10 employs the rental price of capital under the 10% depreciation
assumption.
Hausman tests again allow for the inference of homogeneity across manufacturing sectors,
and the φ- parameter conﬁrms the presence of a long run equilibrium relationship.
On the cyclical methodology, the constant component of the mark-up varies over the
118 − 142% range (for Cyclical5, Cyclical10 respectively), while the cyclical component
suggests a statistically signiﬁcant counter-cyclical variation of the price-marginal cost ratio
over the business cycle for both the Cyclical5 and Cyclical10 estimations.
35Here we follow some of the previous literature such as Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) in the use
of capacity utilization as a cyclical indicator.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 20
While there is some sensitivity of the estimated mark-up to the choice of rental price
of capital, both estimates continue to conﬁrm a substantial mark-up of price over marginal
cost. Moreover, the sign on ζ1 (<0) consistently conﬁrms a counter-cyclical ﬂu c t u a t i o ni nt h e
mark-up for the manufacturing sector, regardless of the choice of the rental price of capital.
4.2.3. The Open Economy Results
In Tables 4 and 5 we report the PMGE estimations for the speciﬁcation given by:36











Variables are as deﬁned above, and X, denotes the import and export penetration ratios in
two separate estimations. We again employ the two alternative speciﬁcations of the rental
price of capital already discussed above.
Hausman tests consistently allow for the inference of homogeneity across manufacturing
sectors. Further, we note that the φ- parameters conﬁrm the presence of adjustment to
equilibrium for all speciﬁcations.
The magnitude of the mark-up parameter, θ1, is consistent with that already estimated
under the preceding sections, regardless of whether estimation proceeds in the presence
of import or export penetration ratios, with the estimate ranging from 76 − 82% for the
speciﬁcation controlling for import penetration, to 85% for the speciﬁcations controlling for
export penetration.
Crucially, we ﬁnd that increased import penetration ratios both within industries and
across the manufacturing sector serve to decrease industry mark-ups (since θ2 < 0 and
θ3 < 0). Similarly, export penetration ratios also serve to decrease industry mark-ups both
36We also estimated the speciﬁcation suggested by Hakura - see equation (8). Results are consistent with
those reported under the present section, though the estimated magnitude of the mark-up is considerably
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within industries and across the manufacturing sector. The implication under the Roeger
methodology is that domestic producers do not appear to be able to price discriminate
between domestic and foreign consumers.
The implication is thus that integrating South African manufacturing sectors into world
markets, has the eﬀect of increasing price competition, and hence lowering the size of the
mark-up. Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustration of the impact of the in-sample changes in
both the within- and between-industry variations in import and export penetration under
the estimated parameter values assuming a 5% depreciation rate of capital.
For import penetration, variation of industry import penetration ratios varies from the
industry speciﬁc mean import penetration ratio over the range of −1 to +3.37 This is labelled
Within Variation. Between Variation refers to variation of industry import penetration ratios
from the all sector mean import penetration ratio. The implication of import penetration
impacts is that an opening of the economy to competition from imports would serve to
reduce the magnitude of mark-ups over marginal cost. For maximum within-industry import
penetration, the mark-up would fall from 82% (the mark-up at the industry mean) to 76%.
More signiﬁcantly, increasing the between-industry import penetration ratio from its mean
value (of 0.38) to the in-sample maximum deviation, serves to drive down the mark-up to
0%.38 Thus, while small variation about an industry mean value of import penetration does
not serve to lower mark-ups, increasing import penetration relative to the manufacturing
sector average, does serve to exercise price discipline on industries. The small eﬀect of
the within-industry variation is further corroborated by the statistical insigniﬁcance of the
coeﬃcient.
For export penetration, for maximum within-industry export penetration, the mark-
up would fall from 85% (the mark-up at the industry mean) to 84%. Again, the strong
impact of international market competition is reserved for the between-industry variation.
37A variation approaching −1 is feasible for a mean import penetration approaching 1, and a time speciﬁc
import penetration ratio of 0.A v a r i a t i o no f +3 is feasible for a mean import penetration approaching 0,
and a time speciﬁc import penetration ratio of 3.
38A between variation of greater than 3.5 only occurs in the Professional & Scientiﬁc Equipment sector.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 22
Increasing the between-industry export penetration ratio from its mean value (of 0.36)t o
the in sample maximum deviation, serves to drive down the mark-up to 30%. Thus, while
small variation about an industry mean value of export penetration does not serve to lower
mark-ups, increasing export penetration relative to the manufacturing sector average, does
serve to exercise price discipline on industries. Again, therefore, within-industry variation
of export penetration appears to exercise little economically meaningful price discipline.
By contrast, export intensive industries have to have considerably curtailed pricing power.
Again, moreover, the small eﬀect of the within-industry variation is further corroborated by
the statistical insigniﬁcance of the coeﬃcient.
4.2.4. The Impact of Market Structure: concentration ratios
Before turning to the impact of intermediate inputs, we consider the impact of industrial
structure and performance on the mark-up. We begin by an examination of the impact of
market structure on mark-up over marginal cost. We thus estimate equation (15) where all
variables are as deﬁned above, but X now denotes the measure of industry concentration. We
employ a Gini coeﬃcient concentration ratio as an indicator of industry concentration.39 We
again employ the now standard two alternative speciﬁcations of the rental price of capital.
Results are reported in Table 6.
Again, Hausman tests consistently allow for the inference of homogeneity across man-
ufacturing sectors, and the φ- parameter conﬁrms the presence of a long run equilibrium
r e l a t i o n s h i pi nt h ed a t a .T h em a g n i t u d e so fm a r k - u p sa r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h o s ef o u n du n d e r
earlier sections.
Note that on both speciﬁcations within-industry variation has no statistically signiﬁcant
impact on the industry mark-up. By contrast, the impact of between-industry variation in
concentration has not only a statistically signiﬁcant impact, but the impact is positive. It
does not appear to be the case that the contestability of markets prevents ﬁrms from exer-
39See Fedderke (2003b) for the full data set and its construction.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 23
cising pricing power under conditions of increased concentration in South African industry.
Indeed, the impact of increased concentration appears to be relatively powerful. Figure
3 reports the impact of within- and between-industry variation in the concentration ratio.
Since the within-industry variation is not statistically signiﬁcant, we focus on the between-
industry variation in industry concentration. Note that the maximum deviation of industry
concentration from the manufacturing mean value (of 0.82)40 serves to increase the mark-up
of price over marginal cost substantially (to a mark-up close to 100%). Conversely, a decrease
in industry concentration ratio below the manufacturing sector mean lowers the magnitude
of the mark-up substantially also - with the maximum deviation being associated with a
mark-up of price over marginal cost of only 20%, rather than 80%.
The implication is clear. Market concentration does impact on the pricing behaviour of
South African manufacturing sectors. Rising concentration serves to raise the market power
of producers, and generating higher mark-ups of price over marginal cost. Conversely, the
implication is that competition policy oﬀers one means of actively improving the competi-
tiveness of South African industry (as measured by the ratio of price to marginal cost).
4.2.5. The Impact of Industry Performance: relative unit labour cost
To explore the impact of industry cost competitiveness we estimate equation (15) where
all variables are again as deﬁned above, but X now denotes the measure of industry compet-
itiveness. We continue to employ the two alternative speciﬁcations for the two alternative
estimated capital rental prices.
The data used in the analysis of competitiveness was obtained from Edwards and Golub
(2002). Competitiveness is calculated using a measure of relative unit labour cost which
represents the labour cost of producing one unit of domestic output relative to other countries
measured in a common currency. Relative unit labour cost is measured as the ratio of
domestic real unit labour cost to foreign real unit labour cost expressed in the domestic
40A higher Gini coeﬃcient implies greater industry concentration.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 24
currency. The reason why this variable is used as a proxy for competitiveness is because
diﬀerences in relative unit labour costs between countries/industries, regardless of how they
are brought about do aﬀect the cost relative incurred by the respective country/industry.
This in turn aﬀects the prices countries/ﬁrms can charge for their product and thus their
relative cost advantage. Edwards and Golub (2002) calculate unit labour cost in a number
of diﬀerent ways. The measure of productivity used to calculate both domestic and foreign
unit labour costs can be either GDP or value-added. The measure used in this paper is the
ratio of real wages to GDP.41 In addition, they use three diﬀerent exchange rates in their
weighting of the relative unit labour cost, taking account of South Africa’s varying trading
partners. This paper employs the trade-weighted real eﬀective exchange rate taking into
account the whole world.42 An increase in the value of relative unit labour costs indicates a
decrease in competitiveness.
Results from estimations are reported in Table 7.
The magnitudes of mark-ups remain broadly consistent with those found under earlier
sections. Similarly, adjustment to equilibrium continues to be present in the estimations,
as is evident from the φ- parameter. Hausman tests conﬁrm the homogeneity of long run
parameters across manufacturing sectors.
Given that cost competitiveness is measured by relative unit labour cost, an increase in
competitiveness is given by
dΩit
dt < 0 - i.e. the Ω- measure of competitiveness is inverted.





dt > 0 therefore signify a fall in competitiveness of the industry relative to the
relevant mean. Results suggest that both between- and within-industry variation of cost
competitiveness exercise a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the mark-up. However, the
impact of the two variations is distinct.
41The authors acknowledge that the interpretation of the ratio of real wages to GDP as an industry com-
petitiveness measure is fraught with danger. This is because this ratio may reﬂect diﬀerences in technology
or the innate characteristics of the industry. However, at a ﬁrst pass this ratio may be useful in highlighting
the impact of industry cost competitiveness on between- and within-industry mark-ups.
42Other possibilities are an exchange rate based only on developed countries’ exchange rates and an
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Given θ2 > 0, a within-industry increase in cost competitiveness serves to decrease the
mark-up. By contrast, θ3 < 0 signiﬁes that a between-industry increase in cost competi-
tiveness serves to increase the mark-up of price over marginal cost. The implication is thus
that market competitiveness does appear to inﬂuence the pricing behaviour of South African
manufacturing sectors, although only within-industry increases in cost competitiveness serve
to lower the mark-up. Improvement of an industry’s cost competitiveness relative to the
manufacturing sector average simply translates into a higher margin between price and mar-
ginal cost. Industries that become more competitive relative to the manufacturing sector
average enjoy higher mark-ups as a result. Only ﬁr m st h a tb e c o m em o r ec o m p e t i t i v er e l a t i v e
to their industry average face lower mark-ups.
Figure 4 again serves to render the estimated impact concrete. For ease of interpretation,
we have inverted the cost competitiveness scale - such that higher is more cost competitive.
In this instance the within-industry variation’s impact on the mark-up is not only statis-
tically signiﬁcant, but also proves to be relatively strong. Thus under suﬃciently strong
increases in the within-industry variation of cost competitiveness and under the estimated
coeﬃcient, it is feasible that the mark-up be driven down close to zero. Conversely, however,
industries that lie above the manufacturing sector mean in cost competitiveness, experience
considerably greater mark-ups of price over marginal cost. The implication is that manufac-
turing industries that do experience improved cost conditions relative to the manufacturing
sector’s average cost, simply absorb the improved production conditions in the form of higher
mark-ups.
4.2.6. Results Incorporating Intermediate Inputs
For the estimation of mark-ups over marginal cost in the presence of intermediate inputs
we employ the speciﬁcation given by:43
43This is smilar to the speciﬁcation provided by equation (9).Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 26
NSR
GO
it = ξ0 + ξ1SCARPETTAit + εit (16)
where
SCARPETTAit = α
GO · ∆(w + l)+β







We again employ the two alternative speciﬁcations for the two alternative estimated
capital rental prices. Thus SCARPETTA5 employs the rental price of capital under the
5% depreciation assumption and SCARPETTA10 employs the rental price of capital under
the 10% depreciation assumption.
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 8 report the PMGE estimations of equation (16).
Adjustment to equilibrium continues to be conﬁrmed in the estimations by the φ- para-
meter. Hausman tests conﬁrm the homogeneity of long run parameters across manufacturing
sectors.
Results indicate the presence of an aggregate mark-up for the manufacturing sector over
the sample period. Consistent with international results, the magnitude of the mark-up is
considerably reduced with the introduction of intermediate inputs. Indeed, the magnitude
of the mark-up over total marginal cost is of an order of magnitude lower than that found by
Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) for the US. The magnitude of the mark-up for South
African manufacturing would appear to lie in the range of 6−9%, lower than the average level
of the mark-up across manufacturing sectors in the US obtained by the Oliveira Martins-
Scarpetta study (13% for US industry).
Two possibilities may account for this divergence between the SA-US relative mark-up
structure under the Roeger and Oliveira Martins & Scarpetta methodologies. The ﬁrst
is that the South African data on intermediate inputs is not fully reliable. The share of
intermediate inputs in gross output in many of the manufacturing sectors averages betweenMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 27
0.8 and 0.9. The results under the inclusion of intermediate inputs may thus be subject to
the errors-in-variables problem.
The second possibility may be that there is an omitted variables bias in the estimation.
Given the strongly divergent levels of concentration between US and SA manufacturing in-
dustry, the most plausible source of the omitted variables bias is the omission of concentration
ratios from the empirical speciﬁcation. For this reason we also estimated:










· SCARPETTAit + εit
where all variables are as deﬁned above, with X denoting the measure of industry concen-
tration.44
Using equation (17) in estimation, the last two rows of Table 8 show that the inclusion
of the deviation of concentration from the industry mean has no impact on mark-ups in the
presence of intermediate inputs.45 However, deviation of concentration from the manufac-
turing sector mean does have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on industry mark-up.
In Figure 5 we detail the impact of the between-industry variation in concentration.
Correcting for the between-industry variation in concentration, it is clear that the industry
mark-up rises considerably above the US level. Thus, if concentration ratios in industry are
controlled for, results from the Roeger and Oliveira Martins & Scarpetta methodologies can
thus be rendered consistent, in the sense that the relative divergence between US and SA
mark-ups can be maintained.
Although we maintain our scepticism about the intermediate input data for SA manufac-
turing, and believe that the results presented in this section should be treated with caution,
44Once again the Gini coeﬃcient is used as a proxy to measure industry concentration ratios.
45Note that these coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 28
one possible explanation for the diﬀerence between the mark-ups in the absence or in the
presence of intermediate inputs may well relate to the role of concentration in South African
manufacturing. While this paper cannot address this concern, it is possible that the high
concentration of SA industry manifests itself in vertical integration of industries as well as
horizontal integration. One possibility is therefore that SA industry actively transfers prices,
making the isolation of precise mark-ups in the presence of intermediate inputs diﬃcult.46
5. Conclusions and Evaluation
The results found in this paper suggest that South African manufacturing industries
show evidence of strong pricing power - up to twice that found in comparable studies for US
manufacturing. This result is shown to be robust to tests including variables accounting for
cyclical variation, openness to world trade, industry concentration and cost competitiveness,
as well as the inclusion of intermediate inputs in marginal cost
Results suggest further that the mark-up is counter cyclical in the South African manu-
facturing sector. Openness of industries to world trade is associated with reduced price-cost
margins, regardless of whether openness assumes the form of increased import or export pene-
tration of an industry. Increased between-industry concentration is associated with increased
pricing power of industry. New variables analysing the impact of industry competitiveness
suggest that industries that can increase their overall competitiveness also experience in-
creased mark-up. Thus increased cost eﬃciency on the part of the manufacturer does not
translate into lower prices. Accounting for intermediate input costs does not alter these
results as mark-ups remain relatively high, controlling for within- and between-industry
concentration ratios.
A central implication of the present paper is therefore that the mark-ups prevalent in the
South African manufacturing sector appears to be consistently higher than in comparable US
46Previous estimates of mark-ups for the earlier results with the inclusion of intermediate inputs indicate
for the Roeger results a decline in the mark-up to 16% whilst for the Cyclical results a decline in the mark-up
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industries. Policy implications are that both trade liberalization, as well as more aggressive
competition policy would serve to reduce price-cost margins, increasing the competitiveness
of South African industry.
Finally, note that the implications of the present study carry signiﬁcant implications
for South African growth prospects in at least two senses. First, the presence of anti-
competitive pricing strategies on the part of South African industry does not augur well
for the competitiveness of South African industry internationally. Second, maintenance of
pricing power entails the curtailment of productive capacity. Low investment rates in South
African industry may well be a reﬂection of monopolistic or oligopolistic practice. Such
questions are left for more detailed future investigation.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 30
References
Applebaum, E., 1979, Testing Price Taking Behaviour, Journal of Econometrics, 9: 283-294.
Bain, J.S., 1953, Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press.
Basu, S., 1995, Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity and
Welfare, American Economic Review, 85, 512-531.
Basu, S., and Fernald, J.G., 1995, Are Apparent Productive Spillovers a Figment of Speciﬁ-
cation Error? Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 165-88.
Beccarello, M., 1996, Time-series analysis of market power: evidence from G7 manufacturing,
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 15, 123-36.
Bils, M., 1987, The cyclical behaviour of marginal cost and price, American Economic Re-
view, 77, 838-55.
Bresnahan, T.F., 1990, Empirical Studies in Industries with Market Power, In Handbook
of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 2 (Schmalense, R. and Willig, R. G., eds) Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Chatterjee, S., Cooper, R., and Ravikumar, B., 1993, Strategic Complementarity in Business
Formation, Aggregate Fluctuations and Sunspot Equilibria, Review of Economic Studies,
60, 765-811.
Chevalier, J.A., and Scharfstein, D.S., 1996, Capital-market imperfections and countercycli-
cal mark-ups: Theory and evidence, American Economic Review,8 6 ( 4 ) ,7 0 3 - 2 5 .
Chirinko, R. S. and Fazzari, S. M., 1994, Economic Fluctuations, Market Power and Returns
to Scale: Evidence from Firm-Level Data, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 9: 47-69.
Cournot, A.A., 1938, Researches into the mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth,
Macmillan.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 31
Coutts, K., Godley, W., and Nordhaus, W., 1978, Industrial Pricing in the United Kingdom,
Cambridge: University Press.
Cowling, K.G., and Waterson, M., 1976, Price cost margins and market structure, Econom-
ica, 43, 267-74.
Cubbin, J., 1983, Apparent collusion and conjectural variations in diﬀerentiated oligopoly,
International Journal of Industrial Organization,1 ,1 5 5 - 6 3 .
Domowitz, I., Hubbard, R Glenn, Petersen, B., 1988, Market Structure and Cyclical Fluc-
tuations in U.S. Manufacturing, Review of Economics and Statistics, 70, 703-25.
Edwards, L., and Schör, V., 2002, Measures of Competitiveness: A Dynamic Approach to
South Africa’s Trade Performance in the 1990’s, South African Journal of Economics,
70(6), 1008-46.
Edwards, L., and Golub, S.S., 2002, South Africa’s International cost Competitiveness and
Productivity: A Sectoral Analysis, Report Prepared for South African national Treasury.
Eichner, A.S., 1973, A theory of the determination of mark-up under oligopoly, Economic
Journal, 83, 1184-1200.
Eichner, A.S., 1987, Prices and Pricing, Journal of Economic Issues,
Fedderke, J.W., 1992, Pricing Behaviour in South African Manufacturing Industry: 1945-82,
South African Journal of Economics, 60(2), 173-90.
Fedderke, J.W., 2002, The Structure of Growth in the South African Economy: Factor
Accumulation and Total Factor Productivity Growth 1970-97, South African Journal of
Economics, 70(4), 611-646.
Fedderke, J.W., 2004, Investment in Fixed Capital Stock: testing for the impact of sectoral
and systemic uncertainty, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66(2), 165-87.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 32
Fedderke, J.W., Shin, Y and Vaze P., 2000, Trade and Labour Usage: An Examination of the
South African Manufacturing Industry, Econometric Research Southern Africa Working
Paper No 15, University of the Witwatersrand.
Fedderke, J.W. and Szalontai, G., 2004, Industry Concentration in South African Manufac-
turing: Trends and Consequences, 1970-96, Mimeo: University of Cape Town.
Friedman, J.W., 1983, Oligopoly Theory, Cambridge: University Press.
Gerald, C.F., Wheatley, P.O., (1989), Applied Numerical Analysis (4th Edition), Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co.
Gollop, F., and Roberts, M., 1979, Firm interdependence in oligopolistic markets, Journal
of Econometrics, 10, 313-31.
Gordon, R.A., 1948, Short-period price determination in theory and practice, American
Economic Review, 38, 265-88.
Hakura, D.S., 1998, The Eﬀects of European Economic Integration on the Proﬁtability of
Industry, International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/98/85.
Hall, R.E., 1988, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in US Industry, Journal of
Political Economy, 96(5), 921-47.
Hall, R.E., 1990, The Invariance Properties of Solow’s Productivity Residual, in P. Diamond
(Ed..) Growth, Productivity, Unemployment, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Hall, R.L., and Hitch, C.J., 1939, Price theory and business behaviour, Oxford Economic
Papers,2 ,1 2 - 4 5 .
Harrison, A.E., 1994, Productivity, imperfect competition and trade reform, Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 36, 53—73.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 33
Haskel, J., Martin, C., and Small, I., 1995, Price, Marginal Cost and the Business Cycle,
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(1): 25-42.
Hazilla, M., 1991, Econometric Analysis of Market Structure: Statistical Evaluation of Price
Taking Behaviour and Market Power, In Advances in Econometrics, (Rhodes, G. F.,
editor), Greenwich: JAI Press.
Helpman, E., and Krugman, P.R., 1989, Trade Policy and Market Structure, Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Leach, D.F., (1992), Absolute vs. Relative Concentration in Manufacturing Industry 1972-
1985, The South African Journal of Economics, 60(4), 386-400.
Levinsohn, J., 1993, Testing the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 35, 1-22.
Modigliani, F., 1958, New developments on the oligopoly front, Journal of Political Economy,
66, 215-32.
Morrison, C.J., 1994, The Cyclical Nature of mark-ups in Canadian Manufacturing: A
Production Theory Approach, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 9(3), 269-82.
Norrbin, S., 1993, The relation between price and marginal cost in the U.S. industry: A
contradiction, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 1149-64.
Oliveira Martins, J., and Scarpetta, S., 1999, The Levels and Cyclical Behaviour of Mark-ups
Across Countries and Market Structures, OECD Economics Department Working Papers
No. 213.
Pesaran, M.H. and Smith, R., 1995, Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 79-113.Mark-up Pricing in South African Industry 34
Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y. and Smith, R., 1999, Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels, Journal of the American Statistical Association,V o l .9 4 ,p p .6 2 1 -
634.
Phelps, E., 1994, Structural Slumps: A Modern Equilibrium Theory of Unemployment, In-
terest and Assets, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Ramey, V.A., 1991, Comment on mark-ups and the Business Cycle by Michael Woodford
and Julio Rotemberg, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
Roeger, W., 1995, Can Imperfect Competition explain the Diﬀerence between Primal and
Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for US Manufacturing, Journal of Political Econ-
omy,1 0 3 ,3 1 6 - 3 0 .
Rotemberg, J., and Saloner, J., 1986, A Super-game-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and
P r i c eW a r sD u r i n gB o o m s ,American Economic Review, 76, 390-407.
Rotemberg, J., and Woodford, M., 1991, mark-ups and the Business Cycle, in O.J. Blanchard
a n dS .F i s c h e r ,e d s . ,NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Ruﬃn, R.J., 1971, Cournot oligopoly and competitive behaviour, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 38, 493-502.
Stigler, G.J., 1964, A theory of oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44-61.
Tirole, J., 2000, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.
Waterson, M., 1984, Economic Theory of the Industry, Cambridge: University Press.
Weitzman, M., 1982, Increasing Returns and the Foundations of Unemployment Theory,
Economic Journal, 100, 787-804.
Yalcin, C., 2000, Price-Cost Marins and Trade Liberalization in Turkish Manufacturing






Leather & leather products
Footwear
Wood & wood products
Paper & paper products




Glass & glass products
Non-metallic minerals
Basic iron & steel
Basic non-ferrous metals
Metal products exlcuding machinery
Machinery & equipment
Electrical machinery
Motor vehicles, parts & accessories
Furniture
Other industry
Table 1: Three Digit Manufacturing Sectors
γ1





















Table 2: PMG estimator results for manufacturing sector mark-up























Table 3: PMG estimator results for the impact of the Business CycleMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 36
θ1





























Table 4: PMG estimator results for Import Penetration Ratios
θ1





























Table 5: PMG estimator results for Export Penetration Ratios
θ1





























Table 6: PMG estimator results for Concentration Ratios
θ1





























Table 7: PMG estimator results for Competitiveness
ξ1















































Table 8: PMG estimator results for intermediate input costsMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 37
Figure 1: Impact of Within Industry and Between Industry Variation in Import Penetration
Figure 2: Impact of Within Industry and Between Industry Variation in Export PenetrationMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 38
Figure 3: Impact of Within Industry and Between Industry Variation in Concentration
Ratios
Figure 4: Impact of Within Industry and Between Industry Variation in Cost Competitive-
nessMark-up Pricing in South African Industry 39
Figure 5: Impact of Within Industry and Between Industry Variation in Concentration
Ratios on Mark-ups in the Presence of Intermediate Inputs